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Bribery and Brokerage: An Analysis of Bribery in Domestic
and Foreign Commerce Under Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act
The continuing disclosures that have been compelled by the
Securities and Exchange Commission1 of bribery of government
officials, both domestic2 and foreign,3 have stimulated interest in the
problem of commercial bribery. This interest is reflected in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19774 , in proposals for new domestic5 and international6 legislation, and in a reexamination of
whether present laws, including the securities laws7 and the antitrust
l. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (1976) (submitted to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, May 12, 1976).
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 9, 1976, at 60, col. 4 (22 government officials rebuked by the
Secretary of the Air Force for accepting hunting trips from Northrop Corp. and Rockwell
International).
3. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1976, at 7, col. l (to that date over 200 firms had disclosed
making questionable payments abroad); id., June 18, 1975, at 7, col. 3. See also Prohibiting
Bribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings on S.3133, S.3379, & S.3418 Befare the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
4. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
The Act might be thought to obviate the need for any other methods of attacking bribes of
fo1eign officials. It amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by making it unlawful for any
domestic concern to bribe a foreign official. However, the Act does not, on its face, provide
any remedies for private plaintiffs, and even if the courts imply a civil remedy, it would probably not be extended to a plaintiff who is a competitor. Since it is the shareholders of the
bribing company who are directly affected by the expenditures offunds for the bribe, and since
competitors are not members of a " 'class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,'"
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (emphasis original) quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916), the courts may limit any implied remedy to those shareholders.
q. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. I, 37 (1977) (implied civil remedy under§ 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act available only to the shareholders accepting the tender offer
and not to a defeated tender offeror).
5. See N.Y. Times, June 15, 1976, at l, col. 5 (city ed.) (President Ford proposes legislation
to curb bribes paid by American corporations abroad).
6. See N.Y. Times, March 6, 1976, at l, col. 4 (city ed.) (United States to seek United
Nations action against corporations engaged in overseas bribery).
7. Before the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, the securities laws compelled disclosure of those aspects of corporate payments abroad which were of interest to investors, but
they did not directly prohibit such payments. It was, of course, hoped that the prospect of
disclosure would deter corporations from making such payments. Moreover, since disclosures
were required only of material facts relevant to investors, some information of importance to
the general public-such as the purposes for which the foreign payments were made or the
identity of the recipients-may have gone undisclosed. See Lowenfels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the Federal Securities Laws, 5 l N.Y.U.L. REV. I (1976); Note, .Disclosure ef
Payments to Foreign Government Officials Under the Securities Acts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848
(1976); Note, Foreign Bribes and the Securities Acts' .Disclosure Requirements, 14 MICH. L. REV.
1222 (1976); Comment, Bribes, Kickbacks and Political Contributions in Foreign Countries-the
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laws, 8 regulate such activities. This Note investigates the feasibility
and wisdom of regulating the anticompetitive effects of bribery in
domestic and foreign commerce through section 2(c) of the Clayton
Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. 9
This Note first analyzes the substantive and jurisdictional criteria
of section 2(c) to evaluate the possible and the desirable scope of its
applicability to commercial bribery. The Note next asks whether
this statute reaches bribery of domestic and foreign government officials and concludes that where the requirements of section 2(c) are
otherwise met and where the person accepting the bribe is acting
administratively rather than politically, 10 the statute could be apNature and Scope ofthe Securities and Exchange Commission's Power To Regulate and Control
American Corporate Behavior, 1916 Wis. L. REV. 1231.
In addition to strengthening the record-keeping and disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 explicitly forbids United
States companies subject to the Securities Exchange Act to offer payment to any foreign official
or political party for purposes of influencing any official act or decision in order to assist the
company in obtaining or retaining business for or with any person, or directing business to any
person. This statute imposes criminal penalties and authorizes the Attorney General to bring
civil actions to enjoin such practices.
8. See Activities ofAmerican Multinational Corporations Abroad· Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 87-97 (1975) (statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Donald I.
Baker); McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad· An Antitrust Approach, 86 YALE
L.J. 215 (1976); Rill & Frank, Antitrust Consequences of United Slates Corporate Payments lo
Foreign O.fficia/s: Applicability of Section 2(c) ofthe Robinson-Patman Act and Sections 1 and 2
ofthe Sherman Act, 30 VAND. L. REV. 131 (1977).
The antitrust laws have rarely been used to combat corporate bribery and have virtually
never been applied in the foreign payments area. However, a bribe of government officials
might be seen as (1) a conspiracy in restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize in violation
of§§ I & 2 of the Sherman Act, but see notes 42-46 il!fra and accompanying text; (2) an illegal
brokerage fee under the Robinson-Patman Act (§ 2(c) of the Clayton Act), the subject of this
Note; or (3) an unfair method of competition under the Federal Trade Commission Act, encompassing Robinson-Patman Act violations. See McManis, supra at 239-49.
9. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or
other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise, either to
the other party to such transaction or to an agent, representative, or other intermediary
therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct
or indirect control, of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such
compensation is so granted or paid.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 expands the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 to enable the government to impose criminal penalties and civil injunctions on foreign
commercial bribery. This Note submits that§ 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act may provide
an alternative route by which private parties, as well as the government, can attack commercial
bribery of both domestic and foreign officials.
10. In determining whether there was a relationship between the government agent's actions and the purported bribe the court must be able adequately to formulate standards for
review of the agent's actions. In a commercial setting this is relatively simple, since the agent
is expected to obtain for his principal the best deal possible. However, while there are government officials who occupy a position similar to that of the commercial agent, some officials are
required to base decisions upon more complex, albeit definite, standards, and others, whose
functions are political rather than administrative, have great discretion. Although the actions
of the first two could be reviewed by a court under the reasonable man standard, the actions of
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plied to bribery of agents of domestic governments. However, a
wholesale application of section 2(c) to bribery of foreign government agents would leave American competitors in foreign commerce
defenseless when competitors not subject to the American antitrust
laws bribed foreign customers' agents. Since this might exclude
Americans from many important overseas contracts without appreciably benefiting competition in any market, application of section 2(c)
to bribery of foreign government agents should be resisted unless the
courts are willing to permit "defensive bribery." 11
I.

THE APPLICATION OF SECTION

2(c)

TO COMMERCIAL BRIBERY

In 1936 Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act 12 as an
amendment to section 2 of the Clayton Act 13 in order to control and
prohibit the injury to small businesses that it believed resulted when
mass buyers used their greater purchasing power to force sellers to
supply them at prices discriminately lower than those available to
the small businesses. 14 Section 2(a), as amended, 15 set forth the conditions under which price discrimination would be unlawful. Although that section covers direct price concessions, Congress feared
that it might not reach subtler methods of price discrimination. 16
One such method involved "dummy" brokerage arrangements in
which intermediaries, often termed brokers, were employed by buyers but rendered no services. Congress was concerned that sellers
were required to pay fictitious brokerage fees that were passed on to
mass buyers, so that these buyers received lower prices for their
purchases than their smaller competitors. Section 2(c) was designed
to prevent this kind of arrangement, 17 as were most early suits
brought under it. 18
the third may rest in part on unarticulated, noneconomic, political principles beyond the scope
of judicial review. See text at notes 129-33 (discussing this problem in the context of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine in domestic commerce) and 140--44 (discussing this problem in the
context of the act of state doctrine in foreign commerce) i,!fra.
11. "Defensive bribery" as used in this Note denotes the behavior of a firm which, after
learning that a competitor is attempting to secure a contract by improper payments to an
intermediary, offers a counter-payment to remain in competition for the contract.
12. Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976)).
13. 15 u.s.c. § 13 (1976).
14. See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
16. See FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 17~-71 (1960).
17. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169 (1960). See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1936).
18. See, e.g., Great AtL & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
308 U.S. 625 (1940); Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co.
v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
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But section 2(c) was worded broadly enough to cover a plethora
of other intermediary transactions as well: it prohibited paying or
granting, or receiving or accepting, "anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered." 19 Moreover,
unlike section 2(a), section 2(c) did not by its terms require a discrimination in price. Further, section 2(c) lacked section 2(a)'s numerous exceptions and defenses. 20 Thus, the courts soon faced cases
involving payments to intermediaries which amounted to commercial bribery.21 In determining the extent to which section 2(c)
19. 15 U.S.C. § l3(c) (1976).
Moreover, the courts have held that a violation of§ 2(c) does not require a finding of actual
injury to competition. See FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 65 (1959). Thus, §
2(c) is usually called a per se rule. See A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 259
(2d ed. 1970). Not even the "except for services rendered" provision was considered an excep•
tion to the flat prohibition against compensating a broker employed by another until the
Supreme Court in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 173-74 (1960), suggested in dictum that there might be situations in which the employee of one party to a transaction might
legitimately render services to the other party. See Empire Rayon Yam Co. v. American
Viscose Corp., 238 F. Supp. 556, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), qffd en bane, 364 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); text at notes 87-93 iefra.
20. In addition to numerous exceptions to the general prohibition against price discrimination, § 2(a) permits the defense of cost justification. Furthermore, under § 2(b), offering discriminatory prices in a good-faith effort to meet competition is a defense to § 2(a).
21. All a plaintiff was required to show was that a commission or discount had been received in lieu of brokerage where no legitimate service had been provided to the person giving
the commission or discount by the person receiving it. See, e.g., Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d
763 (4th Cir. 1939); see also Note, Beleaguered Brokers: The Evisceration of Section 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1308, 1313-14 (1964).
In defining those services that an intermediary could legitimately perform for a brokerage
fee, the courts looked to the legislative intent underlying§ 2(c). Since that section was enacted
in part to prevent hidden price discrimination in the brokerage function, and in part to protect
the "fiduciary relationship" between the broker and his client, the courts uniformly held that
any scheme in which an intermediary received compensation from both the buyer and seller in
a single transaction violated§ 2(c). See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607
(4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d
667 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940). It was believed that dual representation
could disguise price discrimination where the intermediary passed the benefit of his second
commission back to his original employer either directly in cash or indirectly by requiring a
lesser fee from him. As the court in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 674-75
(3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940), pointed out:
The agent cannot serve two masters, simultaneously rendering services in an arm's length
transaction to both. While the phrase, "for services rendered," does not prohibit payment
by the seller to his broker for bona fide brokerage services, it requires that such service be
rendered by the broker to the person who has engaged him. In short, a buying and
selling service cannot be combined in one person.
.
See also Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
While this reading of the statute effectuated the legislative desire of preventing all disguised
price discrimination or other abuses of the brokerage function, it also radically limited businessmen's allocation of the various elements of the brokerage function in any transaction
among themselves, even absent discrimination or other abuse. The effect of these decisions
was to ban outright any payment of brokerage by either party in a transaction to an employee
of the other, even where the latter genuinely performed brokerage service for the former.
While more recent cases have demonstrated a greater flexibility in this area, see note 19 supra;
text at notes 87-93 iefra, the earlier§ 2(c) bribery cases evolved in the context of the inflexible
rule prohibiting a servant from serving two masters.
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should be applicable to bribery, courts have had to interpret both the
substantive and the jurisdictional requirements of section 2(c).
A.

Substantive Requirements of Section 2(c)

Many instances of commercial bribery, unlike other intermediary
transactions attacked under section 2(c), do not result in price discrimination. Since section 2(c) was enacted as part of a scheme to
eliminate discriminatory price differentials obtained by large buyers
who have greater economic power than their smaller competitors,22
it was questionable whether that section should apply when no such
discrimination resulted. In the typical brokerage situation resulting
in price discrimination, mass buyers perform brokerage services for
sellers through a dummy broker and then demand a price differential on the theory that they are paying their salesmen, agents, or brokers to perform the seller's sales funtion. 23 A payment to the broker
is passed back to his employer either directly in cash or indirectly by
discount. As Representative Wright Patman observed:
The legislative history of subsection 2(c) clearly shows that Congress
knew that the only effective way to stamp out and prevent the practice
of mass buyers coercing sellers to pay them compensation for fictitious
sales services was by prohibiting sellers absolutely from paying or allowing any such compensation to any buyers or their intermediaries.24

In the typical bribery situation, on the other hand, the "broker"
keeps the payment himself. The injury is not that the victim has
been charged a discriminatory price, but that he has been fraudulently led to pay a higher price than he otherwise might have paid.
Yet courts have accepted the argument that section 2(c) was
designed with the broader purpose of prohibiting all anticompetitive
intermediary transactions, and thus that it is equally applicable to
this type of situation. In Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power
Co. ,25 the first case to consider the application of section 2(c) to commercial bribery, an electric company purchased coal at inflated
prices as a result of the bribery of its president by a coal supplier.
The court noted that if the president could decide which companies
would supply coal to the electric company and if he would betray the
company for personal gain, no competing coal supplier had a chance
of acquiring a contract with the electric company.26 Since the "bro.. kerage" payment essentially eliminated all competition, and since
section 2(c) was designed to prohibit all anticompetitive intermedi22. See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 110 (1963).
23.
24.
25.
26.

W. PATMAN, supra note 22, at 106.
Id. at 110 (emphasis original).
136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
136 F.2d at 16.

7-16 (1936); W.

PATMAN, COMPLETE
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ary transactions, section 2(c) was held applicable. 27 Later cases
have followed this reasoning. 28
While, as the court in Fitch noted,29 this result appears to apply
section 2(c) to situations other than the price discrimination it was
enacted to prevent, there is evidence that Congress considered such
cases to be properly within the ambit of section 2(c). Thus, as Representative Patman stated during Congress's debate over the Robinson-Patman Act: "A practice has grown up whereby large mass
buyers bribe representatives of the seller . . . under the guise of a
brokerage allowance. It is not a brokerage allowance at all, it is a
bribe. This bill will . . . prohibit one party from bribing the representative of the other."30 The notion that section 2(c) was intended
to protect these fiduciary relationships also appears in the Senate
Committee report that accompanied the Robinson-Patman Act to
the Senate fioor. 31
Yet even if price discrimination is not the only type of injury
section 2(c) is designed to prohibit, and even if the injury resulting
from betrayal of the fiduciary relationship is one of the other injuries
prohibited by section 2(c), further problems remain. What was
Congress's intention regarding the class of plaintiffs who may be
able to invoke section 2(c) protection? Should a class of plaintiffs
that was intended to be protected by section 2(c) be able to obtain
relief under the federal antitrust laws when a remedy is already
27. It could be argued that bribery is merely an additional element in price competition, at
least once a competitor becomes aware of its existence, since the competitor who offers the
most desirable combination of product and bribe will probably receive the contract. But even
if the most efficient competitor would prevail, the principal would usually still have suffered
injury by the bribery of his agent, and Congress sought to prevent that injury by enacting §
2(c). See text at notes 30-31 iefra. In addition, given the imperfect information with which
markets actually operate, a competitor might never learn of his competitors' bribes. See, e.g.,
the situation described in note 110 iefra.
28. See, e.g., Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966), discussed in text at note 45 iefra. In rejecting the argument that§
2(c) requires actual price discrimination, the Ninth Circuit relied on both the legislative history
of§ 2(c), which indicated congressional concern with the fiduciary responsibilities of brokers,
see text at notes 30-31 iefra, and the Supreme Court's dicta in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363
U.S. 166, 169 n.6 (1960), that§ 2(c) was intended to proscribe the bribery ofa seller's broker by
the buyer. 351 F.2d at 856 & n.3.
29. 136 F.2d at 16.
30. 80 CONG. R.Ec. 7759-60 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Patman).
31.Whether employed by the buyer in good faith to find a source of supply, or by the
seller to find a market, the broker so employed discharges a sound economic function and
is entitled to appropriate compensation by the one in whose interest he so serves. But to
permit its payment or allowance where no such service is rendered . . . is but to permit
the corruption of this function to the purposes of competitive discrimination. The relation of the broker to his client is a fiduciary one. To collect from a client for services
rendered in the interest ofa party adverse to him, is a violation of that relationship; and to
protect those who deal in the streams of commerce against breaches of faith in its relations
of trust, is to foster confidence in its processes and promote its wholesomeness and volume.
S. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1936).
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available under state law? Because the question of adequate alternative remedies cannot be completely separated from any definition of
which classes of injured persons should be able to recover damages
under the statutes, these two issues are dealt with simultaneously.
Fitch involved a suit by a principal whose agent had been bribed.
While legislative texts suggest that Congress intended to protect the
fiduciary relationship in this type of situation, 32 it is less clear that
protection should extend to buyers whose brokers have been bribed
by sellers. Support for the position that only the former situation
was considered for protection can be inferred from statements by
Representative Patman at the time the Robinson-Patman Act was
being debated which seem to indicate a concern only for the position
of the seller betrayed by his agent. 33 Moreover, the legislative history contains examples only of bribery of a small seller's agent by a
large mass chain buyer, indicating that Congress may not have anticipated broad protection of the "fiduciary" aspects of the broker's
functions. Such a restriction on the scope of section 2(c) is consistent with the general concern of the authors of the Robinson-Patman
Act for the protection of small, local, independent businesses from
predatory acts of mass-buying national chains. 34
On the other hand, it can be argued that in phrasing section 2(c)
broadly, Congress intended it to apply to any situation in which anticompetitive effects result from abuse of a broker's position.35
When a broker, by accepting a bribe from the other party to the
transaction, betrays his duty to transmit market information to his
principal, the injury to competition is the same whether the principal
is a seller or a buyer.
But even if the principal is within the class of plaintiffs intended
to receive section 2(c) protection, should he receive that protection
when an adequate remedy is available under state law? The concern with protecting the fiduciary relationship between the electric
32. See text at notes 30-31 supra.
33. [O]ur investigation has.disclosed that [a certain sellers' broker] had a secret contract
with a large mass corporate chain buyer by which he obligated himself to sell every car of
. . . potatoes of [his farmer customers] to this large buyer . . . at the market price.
. . . [B]ut fortunately for the large mass buyer, he was big enough to make the market
price . . . . This man representing the farmers sold those potatoes to that mass buyer,
fixing the price himself . . . [and] got a secret rebate of $2.50 to $5 on every car that the
farmers knew nothing about . . . . That is the kind of dummy-brokerage arrangement we
are trying to prohibit in this bill.
80 CONG. REc. 8112 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Patman).
34. See F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 19-23
(1962).
35. As the Supreme Court noted in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 169 (1960):
"Congress in its wisdom phrased§ 2(c) broadly, not only to cover the other methods [of price
discrimination through brokerage] then in existence but all other means by which brokerage
could be used to effect price discrimination. . . ." In a footnote appended to that statement
the Court also noted that§ 2(c) was intended "to proscribe other practices such as the 'bribing'
of a seller's broker by the buyer." 363 U.S. at 169 n.6.
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company and its president in Fitch is arguably met by state common
law on fiduciary duty. 36 Although Fitch's argument that potential
competitors should be protected from the competitive injury resulting from the coal company's president's conduct is plausible, in fact
the decision in Fitch resulted in compensation to the principal rather
than to the injured competitor. In such cases state law is supplemented by a federal antitrust remedy only to the extent that the
threat of liability for treble damages under the latter provides an
additional increment of deterrence. Concern with duplicity of remedies was influential in the Seventh Circuit's refusal to apply section
2(c) in Norville v. Globe Oil & Refining Co. 31 In that case the lessor
of a filling station required the lessee to purchase all his gasoline and
oil from an oil company that held a mortgage on the station. The
lessee purchased these products through the lessor at a price higher
than that the lessor paid the company; the difference in price was
credited to the lessor's account. In granting the defendant's motion
for summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that any
wrongdoings were actionable under state law, and that the antitrust
laws were "never meant to be a panacea for all wrongs." 38
The justification for extending section 2(c) to protect principals
from their unfaithful agents is taken by the courts from congressional statements that section 2(c) was intended to police fiduciary
relationships in general and especially to prevent bribery in such cir36. For example, when the plaintiff in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 110 F. Supp. 96
(S.D. Cal. 1953), lost its§ 2(c) bribery claim for failure to meet that section's commerce requirements, see text at notes 61-62 i,!fra, it simply brought suit in a state court, arguing that
defendant Blade had breached a fiduciary duty. Sears apparently recovered its damages, albeit not trebled. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 139 Cal. App. 2d 580, 294 P.2d 140 (1956).
In at least one jurisdiction such conduct may also constitute a criminal offense. See N,Y.
PENAL LAW§ 180.00 (McKinney 1975) (making commercial bribery a misdemeanor). The
predecessor to this statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 439 (McKinney 1967), however, was construed
as not providing a civil remedy for the injured employer-principal See Heam v. Schuchman,
80 Misc. 311, 141 N.Y.S. 242 (Sup. Ct. 1913), ajfd., 157 App. Div. 926, 142 N.Y.S. 337 (App.
Div. 1913). Since § 180.00 was intended to be a mere reenactment of the relevant parts of
§ 439, see Practice Commentary to N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 180.00 (McKinney 1975), Hearn should
remain good law under § 180.00. Thus, the plaintiff-employer would be limited to theories
that require him to establish that his employee, in accepting the bribe, breached a commonlaw fiduciary duty.
37. 303 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1962).
38. 303 F.2d at 283 (quoting Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961), in which the court refused to apply§ I of the Sherman Act to
an alleged bribery of a government official for the same reason). See note 42 i,!fra. The
Norville court added: "It is, of course, immaterial that the appeal of treble damages and attorneys' fees afforded by federal law may be more attractive than the simple compensatory damages available under state law." 303 F.2d at 283.
A recent case, however, indicates, without reference to Norville, that the Seventh Circuit is
willing to apply§ 2(c) to commercial bribery in some circumstances. Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co.,
538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976). This case involved secret payments made by one frozen-seafood
producer to the agent of a .competitor in connection with the latter's purchase of frozen seafood
from the former.

August 1978]

Bribery and Brokerage

1351

cumstances.39 If Congress expressly enacted section 2(c) to prohibit
bribery, the courts should enforce that prohibition even if they see
no compelling need for additional protection.
When the plaintiff is a competitor of the party offering the bribe,
the problem of duplicity of remedies does not exist. Unlike the injured principal, the competitor is not likely to be protected either by
common-law notions of fiduciary duty«> or by state unfair trade
practice statutes.41 But even though there may be no alternative
remedy, should section 2(c) be applied where, as here, Congress has
not expressed concern for the plight of the competitor? Concern for
the competitor who is excluded because of bribery has not been
believed strong enough to persuade courts to apply the much more
flexible standards of the Sherman Act to such cases.42
39. See text at notes 30-31 supra.
40. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 352 (1958). (Absent an independent tort,
an agent is not liable for harm to a person other than his principal for breach of fiduciary
duty.) See also id.§ 357.
41. Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted unfair trade practices
legislation. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, FACT
SHEET: STATE LEGISLATION TO COMBAT UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (rev. ed. July 1977), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ~ 50,190. Forty-three jurisdictions use some variant of
one of the three alternative forms of the FTC, Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law-Revision, reprinted in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1970 SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION 141. Alternative Form I of this model legislation, adopted in 14 states, prohibits
unfair trade practices in language virtually identical to that of§ 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976). Alternative Form 2, adopted in 14 states,
reaches all forms of deceptive trade practices. Alternative Form 3, adopted in 15 states, itemizes the deceptive practices forbidden, although there is usually a catchall provision to reach
other forms of deception. In seven other jurisdictions, UNIFORM DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, reprinted in 7 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 333 (1970), has been adopted. These
laws provide coverage similar to Alternative Form 3, including, in addition, prohibitions of
unconscionable consumer-sales practices.
Since bribery is rarely encountered on the consumer level, the only forms of these statutes
which might be applicable are those forbidding unfair trade practices in general (Alternative
Form I and, perhaps, Alternative Form 2, where it is extended to cover unfair trade practices
as well as fraudulent or deceptive acts). Section 3 of the FTC's draft provides, however, that
the statute is to be construed with special reference to the federal courts' interpretation of
§ 5(a)(l) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976). Thus, the applicability of such statutes to commercial bribery turns on whether or not "commercial bribery''
constitutes an unfair trade practice under federal law. While the reach of § 5 may go well
beyond that of the antitrust laws, see, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233,
239-44 (1972) (holding that the reach of§ 5 goes beyond practices forbidden by the letter or
the spirit of the antitrust laws), at the very least any violation of the antitrust laws, including
the Robinson-Patman Act, constitutes an unfair trade practice. See, e.g., American News Co.
v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 824 (1962) (violation of§ 2(d) of the
Clayton Act also constitutes an unfair trade practice); United States v. St. Regis Paper Co., 285
F.2d 607, 610 n.4 (2d Cir. 1960), qffd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 208 (1961). Since commercial
bribery violates§ 2(c) of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, it should
also be an unfair trade practice under both federal and state law where the language of§ 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act is employed. This outcome, however, results from the
incorporation of federal unfair-trade law into state law and does not justify limiting§ 2(c) at
the federal level in commercial bribery cases. If§ i(c) did not make such bribery an unfair
trade practice, no state remedy would exist.
42. See Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 944 (1961) (refusing to apply§ I of the Sherman Act in a complex fact situation involving
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Nevertheless, the broad language of the Robinson-Patman Act,
as well as the entire Clayton Act, may require such protection. Congress intended the Robinson-Patman Act to be part of the antitrust
law of the United States,43 and section 4 of the Clayton Act provides
treble damages for "[a]ny person who shall be injured" by violation
of the antitrust laws.44 Even if Congress' concern was the protection
of the fiduciary relationship, a potential competitor is injured by violation of section 2(c) and thus is a proper plaintiff under section 4 of
the Clayton Act. This reasoning was employed to grant section 2(c)
relief in Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons,45 in which a manufacturer of fish food sued a competitor for excluding the former from
selling its product to the State of Idaho by bribing the state employee
who chose the fish food the state purchased. Thus, section 2(c) has
been applied notwithstanding the absence of price discrimination to
commercial bribery both in cases in which the plaintiff was a principal and in cases in which the plaintiff was a competitor.46
alleged bribery of a government official); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp.
393, 399-400 (D. Idaho 1964), qffd on other grounds, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 936 (1966) (refusing to apply § 1 of the Sherman Act to bribery of a state fish-food
purchasing agent); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 687 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976) (refusing to apply§ 1 of the Sherman Act to commercial
bribery, citing the opinion of the district court in Rangen). See note 46 infra.
In fact, the very flexibility of § 1 of the Sherman Act may be a substantial reason for
regulating bribery under§ 2(c) of the Clayton Act instead. Whereas§ 2(c) is limited to payments made to other parties in sale transactions, § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits any conspiracy in restraint of trade. If a conspiracy involving bribery were held to violate § I, it is
difficult to see how the courts could avoid extending Sherman Act coverage to conspiracies
involving other kinds of criminal behavior when a restraining effect on trade is shown. Such
an interpretation could easily lead to the use of antitrust laws to regulate conduct because it is
morally offensive, rather than economically undesirable. A clear example of this tendency
was the Nixon administration's proposal to use the antitrust laws against organized crime.
See Steiner, Toward a National Antitrust Policy?, 21 UNIV. OF MICH. L. QUAD. NOTES 12, 13
(Fall 1976).
43. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) provides in pertinent part that
" 'Antitrust laws,' as used herein, include . . . this Act."
44. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
45. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
46. The District Court in Rangen had refused to apply§§ 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act on the
ground that commercial bribery was "not the type of misconduct within the purview of the
concepts of a combination in restraint of trade or monopoly as well as used in the Sherman
Act," although it did grant relief under§ 2(c) of the Clayton Act. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc.
v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393,400 (D. Idaho 1964), qffd on other grounds, 351 F.2d 851
(9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); see note 42 supra. The Ninth Circuit subsequently cited with approval the Rangen application of§ 2(c) and the refusal to apply the
Sherman Act to commercial bribery in Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 532
F.2d 674, 687 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). Other circuits have also approved
of this application of§ 2(c). See Grace v. EJ. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976); Ideal
Plumbing Co. v. Benco, Inc., 529 F.2d 972,977 (8th Cir. 1976) (dictum); Jones v. Borden Co.,
430 F.2d 568, 572 (5th Cir. 1970) (dictum).
Citing Rangen, the Supreme Court noted, "[B]ribery of a public purchasing agent may
constitute a violation of§ 2(c) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act."
California Motor Transp. Inc. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1970) (dictum).
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Jurisdictional Requirements of Section 2(c)

Section 2(c) prohibits any person (1) "engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce" (2) from paying or accepting anything
of value (3) except for services rendered (4) in connection with the
sale or purchase (5) of goods, wares or merchandise (6) either to the
other party to such a transaction or to an agent, representative or
other intermediary.47 While each of these six requirements has an
established meaning in cases involving price discrimination through
brokerage,48 application of section 2(c) to bribery requires that each
of these elements be reexamined.
1. Engaged in Commerce, in the Course

of Such

Commerce

a. Commerce. Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines "commerce" for the purposes of the entire Clayton Act, including the
Robinson-Patman Act, as "trade or commerce among the several
States and with foreign nations."49 Because the price discrimination
provisions of section 2(a) have been limited to domestic commerce, 50
it has been argued that section 2(c) should likewise be limited.51
However, while section 2(a) is specifically limited to sales for "use,
consumption or resale within the United States," 52 section 2(c) contains no such language. Moreover, the view that the latter should be
applied extraterritorially finds support in remarks of Representative
Patman regarding Congress's intent. 53 The first case to extend section 2(c) to export sales was Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co. 54 Since the
court expressed doubt that the transaction involved was actually an
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976); note 9 supra.
48. See generally F. ROWE, supra note 34, at 330-62.
49. 15 u.s.c. § 12 (1976).
50. See Fimex Corp. v. Bannatic Prods. Co., 429 F. Supp. 978, 980 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (§ 2(a)
not applicable to sales of products intended exclusively for resale abroad). Section 2(a) apparently would apply, however, to the sales of imports in the United States if accompanied by
price discrimination among American buyers. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 402 F. Supp. 244 (E.D. Pa.), petition denied mem., 521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1975).
51. See F. RowE, supra note 34, at 82.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce,
. . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities . . . where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption or resale within the United States . . . .
53. As Rep. Patman indicated after the passage of the Act:
This delimitation [of§ 2{a) to domestic commerce] is not found in the remaining
clauses of the Act, which apply to payment for the use of services and facilities used in
furthering the movement of goods involved in the sales transaction. These clauses apply
to any person engaged in commerce, who in the course of such commerce enters into
actions prohibited by the clauses. To determine the limit and scope of such commerce we
must tum to the definition found in the Clayton Act itself.
W. PATMAN, Tf!E ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 209 (1938).
54. 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
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export sale, but decided the case on the assumption that it was, 55 it
could be argued that the case is dubious precedent. However, in
Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, Inc., 56 the court
held that section 2(c) applied to bribery in a transaction that clearly
involved foreign commerce. 57
b. Engaged in commerce. Section 2(a) requires not only that
the defendant be engaged in commerce, but also that at least one of
the sales compared for the purpose of proving price discrimination
be in interstate commerce.58 Since any person who makes a sale in
interstate commerce is "engaged in interstate commerce," usually all
that has been required to establish jurisdiction is proof of one or
more sales in interstate commerce. 59
Section 2(c), however, does not contain the sales requirement of
section 2(a). But it should be clear that a person whose sales involve
the shipment of goods, wares, or merchandise from one state to another is engaged in interstate commerce. Most cases have taken this
so much for granted that little discussion can be found on this point.
Although all of the early section 2(c) cases involved persons selling
in interstate commerce, none of the opinions discussed the commerce
requirements. 60 Only when a claim had been dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction had the issue been raised. For example, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade,61 the court refused to apply section 2(c) to a
situation in which local printing firms made kick-backs to a Sears
employee in order to secure contracts for printing advertisements.
Because the market was intrastate and there was no evidence that
any of the printing firms had ever engaged in interstate commerce,
the claim was dismissed for failure to meet the "engaged in commerce" requirement.62
Where no interstate sale has occurred, two lines of argument
have been unsuccessful in expanding the "engaged in commerce"
language beyond the restrictive flow of commerce theory outlined
above. The first line of argument, exemplified by Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co, 63 attempts to expand jurisdiction to include any
activity with a sufficient "nexus" to interstate commerce. In that
55. 90 F. Supp. at 305.
56. 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.1::>. Ohio 1964).
57. 227 F. Supp. at 833-34.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
59. See F. RowE, supra note 34, at 78-79.
60. See Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1945); Oliver Bros. v.
FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
61. 110 F. Supp. 96 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
62. l IO F. Supp. at 102.
63. 419 U.S. 186 (1974).
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case defendants were accused of violating sections 2(a), 3, and 7 of
the Clayton Act. Both produced asphalt for street paving, some of
which was used in interstate highways, but none of the sales of either
defendant was in the flow of interstate commerce. The plaintiff argued that the use of the product in interstate highways provided a
sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. Although a similar argument had been successful in cases under the Fair Labor Standards
Act,64 the Supreme Court distinguished those cases on the ground
that while the Fair Labor Standards Act was intended to exploit the
full reach of federal power under the commerce clause, the Clayton
Act was not. 65 Furthermore, the Court stated that because the nexus
approach lacked any inherent limits, it was incompatible with the
practical economic concerns of the antitrust laws. 66
The second unsuccessful line of argument characterizes any
transaction that affects interstate commerce as being in interstate
commerce for the purposes of the Clayton Act. 67 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument in United States v. American Building
Maintenance Industries, 68 in which the defendant, which was itself
engaged in interstate commerce, was charged with violating section 7
of the Clayton Act69 in acquiring several firms which happened not
to be in interstate commerce. Section 7 requires that both the acquiring and the acquired firm be engaged in interstate commerce.
Although the acquired firms affected commerce in that they supplied
services to firms engaged in interstate commerce,70 the Court held
that they were not engaged in commerce for purposes of section 7. 71
After noting that the earlier cases had limited section 7 to the flow of
commerce theory and that the same commerce requirement had subsequently been reenacted in the 1950 amendments to that section,
the Court held that "the phrase 'engaged in commerce' as used in § 7
of the Clayton Act means engaged in the flow of interstate commerce, and was not intended to reach all corporations engaged in
activities subject to the federal commerce power."72 Although the
commerce requirements of section 2(c) have not been expressly reaf64. See, e.g., Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953).
65. 419 U.S. at 196-97.
66. 419 U.S. at 198.
67. Although this argument was made in Copp, the Court did not decide that issue at the
time since it held that an effect on interstate commerce could not be presumed and the plaintiff
had presented no evidence of such effect. 419 U.S. at 202-03.
68. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
69. Section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), provides in part: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire . . . any part of . . . another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
70. 422 U.S. at 283.
71. 422 U.S. at 284.
72. 422 U.S. at 283.
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firmed by Congress, as those of section 7 have been, this definition of
"engaged in commerce" probably applies in section 2(c) cases as
well, since the definition of "engaged in commerce" in section 1 of
the Clayton Act was intended to apply to all of that Act, including
the Robinson-Patman Act.73
c. In the course of such commerce. The "in the course of
such commerce" requirement of-section 2(c) might reasonably be interpreted as requiring that the transaction which gives rise to the
lawsuit occur in interstate commerce. However, courts have not always viewed this requirement so strictly. In Rangen,14 the Ninth
Circuit found that an Idaho corporation doing business in Idaho
which had bribed an employee of the state to induce the purchase of
fish food manufactured in that same state violated section 2(c).75
Although the defendant had sold fish food in interstate commerce in
the past, it was difficult to view the particular sale out of which the
case grew as occurring in the course of such commerce. The court
nonetheless held that bribery in an intrastate transaction which excluded an interstate competitor was within the jurisdictional reach of
section 2(c), relying on the holding of the Supreme Court in Moore v.
Mead's Fine .Bread Co. 16 Moore held section 2(a) applicable to a
New Mexico baker doing business in Texas and New Mexico who
attempted to force another New Mexico baker out of business by
discriminatorily reducing prices in New Mexico but not in Texas.77
The Moore Court explained:
We have here an interstate industry increasing its domain through outlawed competitive practices. The victim, to be sure, is only a local
merchant; and no interstate transactions are used to destroy him. But
the beneficiary is an interstate business; the treasury used to finance the
warfare is drawn from interstate, as well as local, sources . . . .78

The Rangen court reasoned that just as Moore was able to finance
his predatory activities in New Mexico because of profits earned in
Texas, Rangen derived a competitive advantage in its interstate competition from its restraint of the Idaho fish-food trade. 79 But if the
"in the course of such commerce" requirement is to have meaning
beyond the "engaged in commerce" requirement, there must be
73. See F. ROWE, supra note 34, at 77 n.137.
74. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
75. However, the plaintiff, a Utah corporation, apparently was engaged in interstate commerce while it was competing with the defendant to sell fish food to Idaho. 351 F.2d at 860.
76. 348 U.S. 115 (1954). q. Clausen & Sons v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp.
148, 156-57 (D. Minn. 1967), revd on other grounds, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968) (applying the
same rationale in a Clayton Act § 3 case).
77. 348 U.S. at 120.
/
78. 348'U.S. at 119.
79. 351 F.2d at 861.

\
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some nexus between the violative act and interstate commerce. In
Moore the nexus between interstate and intrastate activities is clear.
Assuming that predatory pricing is a rational business strategy in the
relevant market, so the intrastate business that can draw upon resources from markets in other states may have an advantage over the
entirely in.trastate business. 81 But this approach is inapplicable to
section 2(c) bribery cases like Rangen since they do not involve predatory or below-cost sales. Instead, the bribed agent induces his principal to enter into a contract that permits the party offering the bribe
to earn profits in excess of a competitive level. Although those profits could :finance predatory pricing in some other market, any such
conduct should be dealt with under the price discrimination provision of section 2(a).
Another objection to this war-chest interpretation of Rangen is
that absent separate incorporation of interstate and intrastate businesses or absent maintenance of separate accounts, it may be extremely difficult to establish that an enterprise engaged in both
interstate and intrastate commerce has not :financed the former with
proceeds from the latter or vice versa. The fungibility of money
makes such an inquiry absurd. 82 Thus, in many situations the "war
80. Predation is a rational business strategy only where the predator can reduce competition sufficiently to permit an increase in prices and a consequent recovery of the cost of the
predatory effort. The ability of the predator to eliminate its intended victim and thereby reduce competition is determined by the relative efficiencies of and the financial resources available to each firm and by the barriers to entry into the market. See Kohler, The Myth of
Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105 (1971); Telser,
Cullhroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 J. LAW & ECON. 259 (1966). In addition, the
predator must insure that the victim's assets are not sold to a third party which could enter the
market and prevent the predator from obtaining the desired increase in market power. Because § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), prohibits any form of merger which tends
to create a monopoly, the predator itself usually cannot purchase the victim's assets. Unless
the victim's assets are either obsolete or easily shifted to another industry, these assets wonld
remain in the market and prevent the predator from obtaining increased monopoly power.
See Kohler, supra at 107-08. But where the target firm's assets are essentially worthless, that
firm could be only a marginal competitor, and its elimination would probably increase the
overall efficiency of the industry. And where the target's assets could be easily shifted to
another industry, and, presumably, assets used in the other industry could just as easily be
shifted into the predator's industry, barriers to entry in the predator's market would be too low
to make predation remunerative. Thus, predation is likely to succeed only where barriers to
entry are high and the assets involved are firm-specific, such as a certificate of public convenience and necessity in a regulated industry.
81. The importance of adequate capital reserves or borrowing power in a predator struggle
are detailed in Telser, supra note 80. Telser argues that because each firm in a predatory
struggle must obtain funds to cover its losses during that struggle, the firm with the lower cost
of capital will possess a real advantage over its rivals. While in a perfect market the cost of
capital would remain constant, given imperfect information a firm's capital costs may increase
as it is forced to approach investors less familiar with its operations and therefore less willing
to invest in it. If the cost of capital to any business increases as the firm increases its borrowing, the ability to generate low-cost capital internally can provide a real cost advantage to the
firm which is capable of such internal financing.
82. Even given separate interstate and intrastate corporations, where ownership of both
corporations is substantially similar it would be possible, if this approach is accepted, to allow
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chest" presumption is effectively irrebuttable. As a consequence,
the Clayton Act in its entirety, including both section 2(a) and section 2(c), could apply to situations beyond the reach of the Sherman
Act's "affecting commerce" test, since, at least under a literal interpretation of Rangen's jurisdictional test, any firm engaged in both
interstate and intrastate commerce would fall under the jurisdiction
of the Robinson-Patman Act. 83
The lesson of Rangen thus appears to be primarily one of pleading. A complaint alleging only an effect on commerce will probably
be dismissed. A complaint stressing the defendant's involvement in
both interstate and intrastate commerce and alleging a nexus between the restraint on intrastate commerce and the defendant's competitive position in interstate commerce will probably meet the
commerce requirements of section 2(c).
2. Paying or Accepting Anything of Value
While all successful section 2(c) bribery cases have involved direct monetary payments to the agent in question, large contributions
to the agent's political party84 or lavish and extravagant entertainment85 might achieve the desired result without involving an actual
"payoff." Making or receiving a campaign contribution clearly falls
within the prohibitions of section 2(c). 86 But in the case of entertainment it is not always clear where standard business practice
ends and bribery begins. Courts should thus be extremely cautious
about attaching antitrust penalties to legitimate sales techniques.
However, this is a factual rather than a legal issue; where the facts
disclose an attempt to induce the agent or intermediary to breach his
fiduciary duty, the courts should find a section 2(c) violation.
evidence of lower return or of no return on interstate investments offset by higher returns on
intrastate investments, to show financing of interstate predatory pricing.
83. While this interpretation of Rangen appears to extend the reach of the Clayton Act
well beyond that of the Sherman Act, Rangen and Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148 (D. Minn. 1967) (applying the Rangen test in a case arising under§ 3
of the Clayton Act), revd on other grounds, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968), might be limited to
their facts, since any firm making some sales in interstate commerce and therefore "engaged in
commerce" might be viewed as acting "in the course of such commerce" whenever the effect of
that firm's intrastate bribery is to prevent another firm from making a sale in interstate commerce.
84. See, e.g., note 114 infra and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., note 2 supra.
86. Even where the contribution is given to another person or a political party rather than
to the person to be influenced, but is given at the latter's behest, the person being influenced
has received something of benefit. This has been recognized in tax cases involving the anticipatory assignment of income. See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 11 I, 114-15 (1930), in which the
Court held that no anticipatory arrangement could prevent income from being taxed to the
person who earned it.
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3. Except for Services Rendered
Section 2(c) forbids any party to a transaction to make any payment to an agent or intermediary who is not his agent, intermediary,
or representative except in compensation for services legitimately
rendered.87
Early section 2(c) cases held that since "[t]he agent cannot serve
two masters," one party's broker could not be compensated by the
other party to the transaction without violating section 2(c). 88 This
interpretation limited the ability of businesses to allocate the brokerage function among themselves and prevented them from eliminating brokers altogether and passing on the resulting savings to their
customers. 89
However, a more flexible reading of the "services i:endered"
clause was suggested in 1960 by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Henry
Broch & Co., 90 the only section 2(c) case to reach the Court. The
defendant broker was accused of accepting a lower-than-normal
commission rate from the seller so that the seller could offer a price
acceptable to the buyer. Concluding that section 2(c) applied, the
Court noted in dictum that although the purchaser had not provided
any service that might justify the price concession it received, if such
a service had been rendered, the result might have been different. 91
This has led to speculation that the Court would apply the "services
rendered" exception at least when brokers were eliminated in order
to decrease distribution costs and no competitive injury occurred.92
Since Broch, the predominant view in the lower courts has allowed
such a defense. 93
87. 15 U.S.C. § l3(c) (1976).
88. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 674 (3d Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1940). See also Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
89. See, e.g., Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 774 (1945) (holding that Southgate, in eliminating its brokers in certain transactions and
passing part of the resulting savings on to its customers, violated§ 2(c)), discussed in Schiering,
The Robinson-Patmon Act: Is Section 2(c) Back?, 26 CASE W. RE.s. L. REv. 594, 600-01 (1976);
Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12, 15 (6th Cir. 1943).
90. 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
91. 363 U.S. at 173.
92. See Schiering, supra note 89, at 602-03; Note, Beleaguered Brokers: The Evisceration of
Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patmon Act, 17 HAR.v. L. REv. 1308, 1318-19 (1964). But see
Mezines, Brokerage-When Is It Permitted Under the Robinson-Patmon Act?, 1 B.C. INDUS. &
CoM. L. REv. 821, 834-35 (1966).
·
93. See, e.g., Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962) (price cuts justified by decreased costs resulting from elimination of brokers); Green Bay Packaging, Inc. v.
Hoganson & Assoc., 362 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (a defendant who eliminated brokers and
sold its own products directly to customers at correspondingly reduced prices did not violate §
2(c)). But cf. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 859-60 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (though the "services rendered" exception might apply when
a buyer's agent performed promotional services for a seller, the exception does not include
services performed by a buyer's agent for the seller against the interest of the buyer).
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Goods, Wares, or Merchandise

Section 2(c) forbids the payment of anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for services rendered in connection with
the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise.94 The limitation to a "sale or purchase of goods, wares, or merchandise" has
been imposed upon section 2(c) in its entirety, rather than merely to
the "services rendered" clause.95 Courts have treated "goods, wares,
or merchandise" as equivalent to "commodity" in section 2(a) 96 by
limiting section 2(c) to transactions involving tangibles. Thus, in
Freeman v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. ,97 the court refused to apply
section 2(c) bribery analysis to an insurance contract because indemnification against possible loss, rather than a tangible object, was being sold. And in Stutzeman Feed Service, Inc. v. Todd & Sargent,
Inc. 98 section 2(c) bribery analysis was held inapplicable to a construction contract because it involved a significant service element.
While no section 2(c) case has raised the issue of mixed transactions
predominantly involving intangibles, the similar language of section
2(a) has been said to require that "[p]rice quotations fusing physical
elements with dominant intangible factors cannot beget price discriminations in commodity sales within the ambit of the Act." 99
This should be equally applicable to section 2(c), since the commodiThis analysis suggests that§ 2(c) might also be inapplicable in situations other than the
cost-justified price reduction hinted at in Broch when the defendant could show the absence of
competitive injury. If this reading of Broch were accepted, defendants might be able to argue,
at least in cases where price discrimination is the injury to be prevented, that the discount was
equally available to all competitors and that all were functionally able to use it. The general
position of the courts prior to Broch, however, was that functional availability was not a defense to § 2(c). See Southgate Brokerage v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir. 1945), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945).
·
A similar argument based on the Broch dicta exists where the offer of a discount was made
in good faith to meet a lawful, equally low offer of a competitor. Prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Broch, such a defense was also not allowed. See FTC v. Washington Fish &
Oyster Co., 271 F.2d 39, 43-44 (9th Cir. 1959) (expressly distinguishing the Seventh Circuit's
approval of such a defense in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 261 F.2d 725, 727 (7th Cir. 1958),
revd., 363 U.S. 166 (1960)).
While the functional availability argument is admittedly of little relevance to bribery, the
meeting-competition defense might be available where one firm offered a bribe to avoid losing
a sale to a competitor who also engaged in bribery, especially where, as in foreign commerce,
the competitor was not subject to§ 2(c). See note 11 supra and text at notes 152-54 iefra.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).
95. See, e.g., Webb-Crawford Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 1940).
96. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 295 F.2d 375,378
(7th Cir. 1961) (holding that "commodity" as used in§ 2(a) means goods, wares and merchan•
dise and does not include the use of television broadcasting for product advertising). See also
F. RoWE, supra note 34, at 59-61 (discussing in detail the judicial interpretation of§ 2(a)'s
"commodities" requirement).
97. 505 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1974).
98. 336 F. Supp. 417 (D. Iowa 1972).
99. F. RowE, supra note 34, at 60-61.
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ties restrictions of the two sections have been interpreted similarly in
the past.
But if tangibles predominate, section 2(c) may be applicable to
an apparently mixed transaction. In Rangen, the defendant, a seller
of pre-mixed fish food, argued that it had sold the services of mixing
and packaging the food, as well as the food itself, and thus that the
transaction did not fall under section 2(c). 100 The court rejected this
argument, holding that since the ingredients had lost their separate
identities and could be characterized as a new product, the transaction was a sale of commodities. 101
5. In Connection with a Sale or Purchase
Assuming that "in connection with the sale or purchase of goods,
wares, or merchandise," modifies section 2(c) in its entirety, rather
than merely the "services rendered" clause, this limitation might
place certain types of bribery outside the scope of section 2(c). For
example, in Rodman v. Haines 102 the court refused to apply that subsection to the alleged bribery of employees to induce their employer
to enter into leases at excessive rates, since a lease is not a "sale or
purchase." 103
6.

To an Agent, Representative or Other Intermediary

Bribery of a purchasing agent, as in Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co.
v. .D. Loveman & Sons, 104 or a corporate representative, as in Fitch v.
Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 105 may violate section 2(c).
In some cases, however, the facts may not fit the language of this
subsection so easily. Where the person accepting the bribe does not
actually make the purchasing decision for his employer but only advises him concerning it, there is a plausible argument for limiting the
applicability of section 2(c). Although he owes certain duties to his
employer, such a person is not in the fiduciary position of an agent
or a corporate officer.
However, section 2(c) has not been so limited. In Rangen,
Grimes, who accepted the bribe, had been employed to test fish
foods and to recommend which should be purchased. The ultimate
decision, however, was made by other employees. 106 While the defendant characterized Grimes as an employee rather than as a broker or agent, the court treated him as an intermediary within the
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

351 F.2d at 862.
351 F.2d at 861-62.
1976-2 Trade Cas. ~ 61,074 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
1976-2 Trade Cas. at 69,842.
227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943).
351 F.2d at 854.
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meaning of section 2(c), since he was instrumental in his employer's
purchasing decisions.
It has been suggested that an intermediary or agent who accepts a
bribe to betray his principal should no longer be deemed an intermediary or agent. This argument was rejected in both Rangen 101 and
Fitch . 108 Thus, any person who occupies a position of trust for valuable compensation and who abuses that trust by inducing his employer to enter into an unfair contract for the sale or purchase of
goods, wares or merchandise should be held to be within the jurisdictional requirements of section 2(c). 109
11.

BRIBERY OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Part I of this Note demonstrated that, where section 2(c)'s substantive and jurisdictional criteria are met, the section is applicable
to bribery of commercial agents. This part examines the feasibility
and desirability of utilizing section 2(c) to prevent bribery of government officials for commercial purposes.
Such bribery can take three forms. The first is "predatory" bribery, whereby a company bribes an agent or representative of a prospective buyer to obtain a sale that might otherwise have been lqst to
a competitor. The aerospace industry has apparently often experienced this form of bribery. Lockheed, for instance, has allegedly
been involved in overseas payoffs to obtain weapons contracts since
at least the middle of the 1950s,110 throughout the 1960s111 and into
the 1970s. 112 Such payoffs can take the form of direct payments,
such as those .allegedly made to Prince Bernhard of the Nether,lands,113 political contributions, such as those allegedly made,to the
107. 351 F.2d at 862.
108. "[A] faithless agent, in the course of representing his principal, does not by his departure from fidelity, become less an agent." 136 F.2d at 15.
109. The language of§ 2(c) would permit its application to situations where the person
accepting the bribe was not even an employee of the other party to the transaction when the
intermediary was under the "direct or indirect control of the other party," as when a person
agrees to represent a friend without compensation. However, given the absence of expressed
congressional concern in this area and the lack of a compelling need for regulation of such
activity, no court is likely to extend § 2(c) this far.
llO. For example, in late 1958 and early 1959 the Lockheed F-104 Starfighter and the
Grumman FllF-lF Super Tiger were evaluated by the Germans and the Japanese. The
Grumman design lost the initial competition in Germany, but was selected by the Japanese for
their Self Defense Force. After alleged payoffs approaching $1.5 million, Lockheed evidently
"persuaded" the Japanese government to change its mind and reject the Fl IF in favor of its
own F-104. Grumman apparently was never made aware of this misconduct. See N.Y.
Times, April 2, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
111. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Lockheed ex-employee discloses payoffs
in 1960s to sell F-104s).
112. See, e.g., id., Aug. 4, 1975, at 2, col. 2 (Lockheed admits payoffs of $22 million to
foreign officials and political organizations to secure contracts).
ll3. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1976, at 53, col. 1.

August 1978]

Bribery and Brokerage

1363

German Social Democratic Party of Franz-Josef Strauss, 114 or lavish
entertainment. 115 Northrup, 116 Boeing, 117 and Dassault ofFrance 118
have also been accused of such activity. This sort of bribery, however, is not directed exclusively toward government agents; many of
the section 2(c) cases discussed in Part I above involved bribes of
private purchasing agents. 119 In either situation, the anticompetitive
effect is the same-the party offering_ the bribe obtains an unfair advantage in competition for sales.
A second form of bribery seeks to obtain favorable treatment or
regulation by a domestic or a foreign government. 120 Where the
regulatory preference restricts or eliminates competitors from a market, the anticompetitive effect is obvious. However, such conduct
cannot be curbed by section 2(c) where the "sale or purchase" requirement is not met.121
114. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Lockheed ex-employee reports contributing to the German Social Democratic Party to secure aircraft sales).
ll5. See, e.g., note 2 supra.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1976, at 45, col. 2 (Boeing allegedly made payments to
executives of the Egyptian national airline to sell co=ercial jets).
ll8. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. ll, 1976, at 75, col. 3 (Dassault officials on trial in the
Netherlands for bribing government officials in order to sell jet fighters).
119. See, e.g., Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943)
(bribery of the president of an electric company to obtain sales contracts for coal), discussed in
text at notes 25-28 supra; Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp.
829 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (bribery of purchasing agent); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of
America, 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976) (bribery of purchasing
agent); Grace v. EJ. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976) (bribery of plaintiff's sales manager).
120. For example, in 1968, the United Brands Company, formerly the United Fruit Company, allegedly paid the then-President of the Honduran Republic $1.25 million in order to
obtain a 50% reduction in the tax on bananas exported from that country. Wall St. J., April 9,
1975, at l, col. 6. United Brands also has been accused of paying $750,000 to prominent
Italian politicians to win relief from the Italian Government's quantitative restrictions on Central American banana imports. Wall St. J., April 10, 1975, at 2, col. 2. Similar cases have also
arisen domestically. 'For instance, in Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F.
Supp. 350 (N.D. Ill. 1974), discussed in note 133 i'!fra, defendant Rockford was charged with
bribing municipal legislators to obtain local ordinances prohibiting Metro Cable from providing competing cable television service in that municipality. See also Sun Valley Disposal Co.
v. Silver State Disposal Co., 420 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1969) (bribery to obtain exclusive county
refuse-disposal contract).
121. For a discussion of the purchase or sale requirement, see text at notes 102-03 supra.
However, if the political nature of the actions involved was held not to bar application of the
antitrust laws, see note IO supra, such conduct might be attacked as a monopolization of foreign co=erce under § 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization of or an attempt to monopolize any part of trade or co=erce. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). The requirements
for a § 2 offense, simply stated, are monopoly power and actions tending to restrict competition
on the merits. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass.
1953), qffd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Since the very preferential nature of the regulation achieved is inherently anticompetitive, the act of seeking such regulation should meet the
United Shoe "tending to reduce·competition" test. Therefore, a plaintiff would need to prove
only that the degree of the exclusion generated by the regulation was great enough to grant the
defendant a monopoly. In such a case, both the geographic and product markets would be
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A third form of bribery occurs where businesses must pay "baksheesh" to prod foreign bureaucracies into taking actions they are
obligated to take, 122 such as issuing building permits or providing
electricity or water. This form of bribery is distinguishable from
both of the above. Because all businesses must make such payments, they more closely resemble a tax than a bribe. Indeed, much
evidence exists that many non-Western nations rely on such contributions to provide necessary income for otherwise underpaid bureaucrats.123 Because they affect all competitors equally, the impact
of such payments on competition may be insignificant. However,
where the sale or purchase and commodities restrictions of section
2(c) are met, such transactions may fall within that section's literal
language. Whether any of these forms of bribery of government
officials should be attacked under section 2(c) is another question.
A. Application

of Section 2(c) to Bribery of .Domestic Government
Officials

It has been seen that in Rangen the court held section 2(c) applicable to bribery of a state government employee without distinguishing between bribery of commercial agents and bribery of
government purchasing agents. 124 Bribes of government purchasing
agents form a familiar pattern: although a state may be able to protect itself by enforcing its criminal statutes, 125 no redress is offered
the injured competitor. Nevertheless, as was noted above, when it
enacted section 2(c), Congress was concerned for the injured principal rather than the excluded competitor. 126 While the applicability
of section 2(c) to bribery of government agents might be thought to
depend on legislative intent, it is unlikely that Congress considered
defined by the government regulation. The Sherman Act has extraterritorial application.
See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (holding§§ l & 2 of the Sherman Act applicable where the defendant, by abusing power granted to
it by the Canadian government, ex.eluded the plaintiff from the Canadian vanadium market);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding § 2 of the
Sherman Act applicable to actions taken abroad which were intended to monopolize aluminum production).
122. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1977, at 35, col. 2 (describing routine baksheesh required by foreign government officials).
123. See Strauss, Yes,yes, it's greft. But don'ljight., N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1977, at'35, col,
2 (arguing that graft is a way of life in many countries). For a passionate defense of bribery as
an "international custom," see Note, Payments to Foreign Officials by Multinational Corporations: Bribery or Business Expense and the Effects of United States Policy, 6 CAL. W. INTL, J,
360, 363-66 (1976).
124. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966), cited with approval in
California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
125. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 200.00 (McKinney 1976) (making bribery of state government officials a felony); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 67 (West 1976) (prohibition against bribery of
state governments). See also 18 U.S.C. § 209 (1970) (prohibiting federal employees from accepting outside compensation for services rendered in their capacity as federal employees).
126. See text at notes 32-34 supra.
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the possibility that section 2(c) might be applied as in Rangen. This
application must therefore be justified by those modem interpretations of sovereign immunity which suggest that where the government acts "commercially" rather than "governmentally," it is as
subject to regulation as private individuals engaged in the same activity.127 Since section 2(c) is limited to sale and purchase transactions, it will seldom be applied to any function so uniquely
governmental as to preclude sensible analogy to the commercial
bribery cases. 128
Bribery of government purchasing agents might arguably fall
within the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which grants immunity from
the antitrust laws to certain forms of conimunication between domestic governments and their citizens. 129 In Ca!!fornia Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 130 however, the Supreme Court held
that where the communication claim is a mere "sham" intended to
mask anticompetitive conduct, the antitrust laws apply. The Court
indicated in dictum that bribery of a government purchasing agent,
as in Rangen, falls within the "sham" exception to Noerr-Pennington
immunity. 131 Although some commentators view this dictum as
placing all bribery of government officials in the "sham" exception, 132 at least one lower court has indicated that bribery of persons
with legislative responsibilities may be treated differently than bribery of persons with judicial or administrative responsibilities. 133
127. "[W)hen a government becomes a partner in a trading company, it divests itself, so far
as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a
private citizen." Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824).
128. As long as the decision is made by an administrative official on the basis of comprehensible standards, judicial review seems possible. See note 10 supra. But where the legislature, for example, makes these decisions case by case through procurement legislation directed
to a specific contract, or where it delegates its legislative authority, readily discernible standards of review may be lacking. See note 133 i'!fra.
129. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1961) (holding the Sherman Act not applicable to the petitioning of political officials to obtain
preferential regulation); UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1964) (extending the Noerr rationale to protect certain petitioning even though it is shown to be part of a broader conspiracy
in restraint of trade).
130. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
131. 404 U.S. at 513.
132. See, e.g., McManis, supra note 8, at 240.
133. See Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350, 358 (N.D. Ill.
1974) (holding in a Sherman Act bribery case that legislative proceedings by their very nature
could not give rise to the "sham" exception since legislatures, unlike courts and administrative
agencies, may make decisions based on considerations of policy not a part of a judicial or
quasi-judicial record).
Although no court has yet applied§ 2(c) to a case involving bribery to obtain a procurement contract, such a transaction could, if it involved a purchase or sale of goods, wares, or
merchandise in interstate commerce, fall within the language of that section. However, in
such a case the court would lack the power to review the actions of the government agent or
the party offering the payment, as such conduct would be political rather than economic and
hence within the protection of Noerr-Pennington. See generally Costilo, Antitrust's Newest
Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66 MICH. L. REV. 333 (1967); Note, Application of
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However, since most section 2(c) cases will involve purchasing
agents rather than legislators, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is not
likely to prevent recovery in most such cases. Thus, there appears to
be no reason that section 2(c) should not be applied to bribery of
most domestic government officials in the same way that it is applied
to bribery of commercial agents.
B. Application

of Section 2(c) to Bribery of Foreign

Government

Officials

No case has raised the question of the applicability of section 2(c)
to bribery of foreign government agents. But in view of the recent
interest in curbing such bribery, as evidenced by Federal Trade
Commission investigations of allegations that such payments were
made by the General Tire and Rubber Company in Morocco 134 and
by Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Europe, 135 and in view of
many such incidents revealed in response to SEC disclosure requirements, 136 the question will probably confront the courts soon.
Need the United States provide an antitrust remedy in such a
situation? Foreign governments, like states, can protect themselves
through their own criminal laws. 137 But, as is the case with laws
prohibiting domestic bribery, these laws do not compensate the injured competitor-the only private remedy available outside the an,.
titrust laws is through a disclosure suit under the securities laws.
But this remedy is intended to promote accountability to shareholders, not to redress competitive injury. 138 Thus, given that other laws
are inadequate and that section 2(c) has been applied extraterritorially, 139 that section is as appropriate a weapon to combat bribery of
government officials abroad as at home.
Two possible obstacles might prevent applying section 2(c) to this
situation: the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state. Sovthe Sherman Act to Attempts To I1!fiuence Government Action, 81 HARV. L. REV. 847 (1968);
(arguing for application of Noerr-Pennington where the action to be influenced was "political"
rather than "administrative").
134. Wall St. J., April 28, 1976, at 4, col. 2.
135. Id., Aug. 24, 1976, at 2, cor. 2.
136. Id., Sept. 16, 1976, at 7; col. I (by that date over 200 firms had admitted making
payments abroad).
137. This power has been recognized by the United Nations Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974), reprinted in 14 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 251 (1975) (every state has the right to regulate foreign investment within its jurisdiction in accordance with its laws). Indeed, the board
of directors of Gulf Oil Corp., iii their investigation of overseas bribery, were unable to identify a single country in which bribery of government officials to procure a contract was not
made illegal by that country's laws. See Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 6 (testimony of John
J. McCloy).
138. See McManis, supra note 8, at 228-31.
139. See text at notes 50-57 supra.
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ereign immunity prohibits one nation from enforcing its laws against
the sovereign representatives of another nation or its agents. 140 But
this doctrine would at most preclude a suit against the government
agent accepting the bribe; it would not prevent an action against the
party offering the bribe. 141 The act-of-state doctrine is said to prevent the courts of one nation from sitting in judgment on the acts of
another nation committed within the latter's own territory. 142 In the
United States, this doctrine is part of the political-question doctrine,
which allocates the function of determining the validity of the actions of foreign nations to the executive rather than to the judicial
branch of government. 143 The primary rationale for this is that judicial inquiry into the legality of acts of foreign governments might
impair the diplomatic functions of the executive. 144
These doctrines, however, will be inapplicable in many bribery
situations. First, not every instance of a government official accepting a bribe is necessarily an act of the sovereign. Although acts
of heads of state or foreign ministers are clearly acts of the sovereign,
other government agents are immunized only for those acts that the
state authorizes them to perform or that they must perform in order
to complete their delegated duties. 145 In Continental Ore Corp. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 146 the Canadian government had delegated the power to purchase vanadium for the Canadian government. The delegates used this power to exclude Continental from
Canada's vanadium market. The Supreme Court refused to apply
the act-of-state doctrine, noting that the exclusion of Continental re140. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW§ 65 (1965).
141. See McManis, supra note 8, at 233-34.
142. While the precise meaning of the doctrine is unclear, see Calvani, Book Review, 74
MICH. L. REv. 164, 171-72 (1975), this appears to be the best available definition. See id.;
Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
143. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
144. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423-24, 427-28 (1964).
Since the basis of the political question doctrine is the judiciary's inability to formulate
judicially enforceable standards for government officials whose activities are controlled primarily• by the political process, this doctrine should not be invoked where the functions of the
foreign government official in question are clearly'delineated. As the United States Supreme
Court stated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962): "The doctrine of which we treat is one
of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases.' "
But where the court cannot formulate such standards because of lack of knowledge of how
the foreign government in question actually functions or because that government places substantial discretion in the hands of the official without any apparent limits or controls other than
those politically imposed, an American court should not attempt to resolve the controversy.
In such cases the action of the foreign official should be considered an act of the state he
represents. Thus the scope of the act-of-state doctrine is in many ways similar to the scope of
the Noerr-Pennington exemption for the political acts of domestic governments. See note 127
supra and text at notes 129-33 supra (discussing the application of§ 2(c) to domestic government officials).
·
145. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 66 (1965) (outlining the
scope of sovereign immunity).
146. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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sulted solely from the action of these delegates and had not been
intended by the Canadian government. 147 Where, as here, governmental power is used without governmental consent, no sovereign
immunity precludes adjudication in an American court. In bribery
cases brought under section 2(c), it should often be possible to prove
an absence of authorization, since such bribery is outlawed by most
foreign countries. 148
Second, both the sovereign-immunity and act-of-state doctrines
may be irrelev3.11:t to bribery cases in which the foreign government
is acting "commercially," rather than governmentally. 149 When a
government functions as a private business enterprise, the courts
should be able to judge it as such. In such a situation, refusing to
apply these doctrines is consistent with the rationale of the politicalquestion doctrine. Thus, bribery in many procurement-contract
cases might be brought within the ambit of section 2(c). However,
there may be some procurement contracts that cannot be evaluated
in purely "commercial" terms. For example, in the case of a contract for sophisticated military equipment, an American court may
be unable to determine another nation's optimal mix of design
specifications and cost without assessing that nation's security
needs. 150 Such an assessment is clearly governmental, not commercia1.1s 1
But even if these doctrinal obstacles can be overcome, an important distinction between domestic and foreign commerce renders the
wisdom of applying section 2(c) to the latter questionable. In domestic commerce, all competitors are subject to the United States
antitrust laws. But in foreign commerce, only those competitors
within the jurisdiction of a United States court are so subject. If a
company not within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the antitrust
laws offers a bribe, a competitor within that jurisdiction faces two
unacceptable alternatives: he must either refuse to offer a counterpayment and lose the contract or offer the payment and risk treble147. 370 U.S. at 705.
148, See note 137 supra.
149. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-706 (1976)
(four of the five Justices concurring in the result stated that both sovereign immunity and the
act-of-state doctrine should be limited to "governmental" as opposed to "commercial" activities).
150. Compare Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(purchase of military equipment is governmental function, and hence protected by sovereign
immunity) with Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of Romania, 403 F. Supp. 1298, 1302
(N.D. Ill. 1975) (breach of wine-distributorship contract not within scope of sovereign immunity).
151. Nevertheless, this argument carried too far could obliterate the distinction between
commercial and governmental decisions, since any action can affect the legitimate concerns of
a foreign government. See, e.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280
(D.D.C. 1952) (commercial actions of Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Ltd., owned 50% by Great Britain, protected by sovereign immunity because oil essential to British Navy).
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damage liability. Foreign firms would thus be able to exclude all
American competitors from the competition for any contract by
bribing an intermediary in the transaction and threatening to sue
any American competitor responding in kind. Since predatory bribery, like baksheesh, is reportedly routine business practice in dealing
with the governments of many foreign countries, 152 applying section
2(c) to such cases would severely restrict the competitive position of
American businessmen abroad in an attempt to prevent the lesser
evil of predatory bribery. Thus, unless section 2(c) can be construed
to permit a defendant in foreign commerce to avoid liability by
showing that the payments he made were defensive rather than predatory, 153 application of section 2(c) to bribery of foreign government
purchasing agents would probably cause more harm than good. 154
152. See notes 122-23 supra and accompanying text.
153. One possible method of exonerating defensive bribery would be to apply the "meeting
competition" defense of§ 2(b), discussed in note 20 supra, to § 2(c). Although the Supreme
Court indicated in FfC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960), that this defense was not
directly applicable to§ 2(c), the Court's analysis of competitive injury in the price-discrimination context might be extended to foreign bribery cases in order to permit a defendant to prove
an absence of such injury by showing that he made the payment in good faith in response to a
similar offer by a competitor. This argument is developed more fully in note 93 supra.
In § 2(a) cases, however, the meeting-competition defense has been available only where
the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that his competitor's offer was lawful. See
FfC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945) (holding that a sugar manufacturer could
not defend his otherwise illegal, basing-point price scheme under§ 2(b) simply because all
other sugar manufacturers in his market employed similar pricing schemes). But it is not clear
that an action by a foreign business not subject to American antitrust laws that would have
violated the Robinson-Patman Act if done within the jurisdiction of the United States should
be an unlawful action for the purposes of§ 2(b). Cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (holding that the legality of actions should be determined by the law
of the place where the activity occurred). Indeed, where the Robinson-Patman Act cannot
protect those subject to its requirements from the predatory actions of others, a compelling
justification exists for permitting businesses otherwise subject to that Act to protect themselves
through defensive bribery.
An alternative way to distinguish between predatory and defensive bribery is to invoke the
equitable doctrine of "unclean hands." This doctrine might be used to deny American antitrust law remedies to a foreign business not subject to the Act if that business first offered a
bribe but lost the contract because of a counterbribe from a firm subject to the Act. While this
approach would prevent the foreign firm from using both the bribe and the threat of suit to
exclude an American firm, it would not preclude a third party from bringing such a suit.
Thus, the American firm might still view the risks associated with offering a counterbribe as
excessive and withdraw from the market. In addition, the status of the unclean-hands defense
in antitrust law was put in doubt by the United States Supreme Court's rejection of the analogous doctrine of in pari delicto in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134 (1968). However, where a firm not subject to American antitrust laws takes advantage of that position by offering the initial bribe and the American firm offers a counterbribe in
self-defense, it is at least arguable that a court shoul~ not view both those firms as equally at
fault.
154. A similar argument under the Sherman Act was rejected by the Supreme Court in
Ti.mkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), on the ground that to allow
defendants to justify actions in restraint of trade as necessary to meet foreign competition
would make the Sherman Act a "dead letter." 341 U.S. at 599. This holding should not,
however, be applied to§ 2(c), since Sherman Act violations such as price fixing, market allocations, and concerted refusals to deal, unlike bribery in violation of§ 2(c), involve collusive
behavior among competitors which enriches all competitors at the consumers' expense. Any
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III. CONCLUSION
The prohibitions of section 2(c) of the Clayton Act, as amended
by the Robinson-Patman Act, are applicable to bribery of both commercial agents and domestic government purchasing agents in interstate commerce. In these situations section 2(c) redresses a
legitimate competitive injury, since bribery in such cases eliminates
competition on the merits. While section 2(c) theoretically can be
used to prevent the similar competitive injury that results from bribery of foreign government officials, as that statute is presently interpreted, the overall competitive impact on American business of such
an extension of section 2(c) would be unfortunate. But, if section
2(c) is construed to permit defensive payments in appropriate circumstances, that statute offers a unique and valuable tool for limiting the competitive injury caused when American businessmen bribe
the agents of foreign governments.
individual competitor not holding its prices at the inflated level established by the conspiracy
would presumably increase its market share at the expense of the other firms in the market.
While a competitor forbidden by United States law to join such a restrictive cartel might not
reap the monopoly profits it would get if allowed to participate in the cartel, he would probably earn a reasonable return despite the cartel. A competitor faced with a § 2(c) payment
problem in foreign commerce, on the other hand, must either offer a counter-payment to protect its market position or be excluded entirely. In this situation, holding American competitors to a higher standard than that generally prevailing in the relevant market might
disastrously impair the ability of American business to compete in foreign markets.

